https://x.com/yossibenyakar/status/2081295404398739763?s=51&t=cLq01Oy84YkmYPZ-URIMYw
https://x.com/realmaalouf/status/2081043338317168891?s=51&t=cLq01Oy84YkmYPZ-URIMYw
https://x.com/realmaalouf/status/2080810588498747693?s=51&t=cLq01Oy84YkmYPZ-URIMYw
https://x.com/gbnt1952/status/2080638097230889190?s=51&t=cLq01Oy84YkmYPZ-URIMYw
" Do Americans not realize that when Islam claims it is the religion of peace, they aren’t actually lying? Their worldview is that the world cannot see peace until every person on earth submits to Allah. That means that anyone who does not submit to Allah is directly combatting their peace and must be force converted or killed. That’s the entirety of their ideology masquerading as a religion. Thats why they have killed or force converted hundreds and hundreds of millions since their pedophilic warlord created their “religion” nearly 1400 years ago."
https://x.com/jordanbpeterson/status/2079970018914381974?s=51&t=cLq01Oy84YkmYPZ-URIMYw
"
Of course there was a cover-up. Of course it continues—witness the deafening silence of the legacy media in response to Rupert Lowe’s crowdfunded Rape Gang Inquiry, a silence identical to that which greeted every earlier report of the sexual atrocity now seemingly integral to multicultural Britain.
How could it possibly be otherwise?
The events documented in Lowe’s Inquiry are so foreign to Western experience and so incomprehensibly terrible that anyone normal first responded to their revelation with minimization, avoidance, disbelief—even outright denial— and search for fault with the victim. This proved particularly true of the modern liberal citizen, with his fervent but untested faith in intrinsic human goodness, certainty that all cultures are equally valuable, and insistence that tolerance is the supreme virtue.
The Honest Society
Such views, however, are justified and productive only within so-called high-trust societies—and those are prohibitively difficult to establish, and therefore rare. The default human being is selfish, and the default community tribal, violently so: “I against my brothers; I and my brothers against my cousins; I, my brothers, and my cousins against the world.” Only the disciplined, endless application of carrot and stick transforms those default conditions into their trustworthy and productive alternatives.
This is not to say that the child lacks the impulse for good. But the better angels of his nature will not prevail in the absence of programmatic encouragement of the good and placement of stricture on the bad. Pursuit of immediate gratification is the natural motivation, simple, and requiring a minimum of foresight, planning and energy. Consideration of others and of the future is, by contrast, a complex, demanding enterprise.
It might be noted, too, that “high-trust” is a misnomer, as it places the cart before the horse—and it is important, as we shall see, to get the terminology exactly right. High-trust societies do not arise from a pre-existent blind faith in human nature. They emerge instead because the typical transaction, even between strangers, has become transparent, so that the parties involved say what they mean and do what they say. This pattern of exchange characterizes what are properly termed honest societies—a term avoided, I suspect, for the judgment it implies about cultures that do not qualify. But the facts remain: in some places people follow an ethic that transcends the local, and in others they don’t. It is to the former that citizens of the latter flee when the situations in their states degenerate beyond tolerability.
It was the Judeo-Christian ethic that made truthfulness, in the West, a matter of eternal consequence. Integrity in word and deed, on pain of hellfire: from that demand grew the majority of the world’s most peaceful and productive societies. On the reward side? Heaven beckoned to those who conducted themselves in the requisite manner. A culture that had made revenge an art gave way to one in which the admirable man was honest in all things. A society noble in the archaic sense—one where the strong, as a matter of course, oppressed the weak—was transformed into one where strength itself came to be defined as willingness to stand up for and protect the vulnerable. The magnitude and impossibility of this accomplishment can hardly be overstated.
On the stick side was a judicial system that, from 1500 to 1750, executed or otherwise eliminated one to two percent of men per generation. During this period, homicide and other crime rates plummeted. Some argue that such severity exerted genuine evolutionary pressure, reducing the prevalence of antisocial traits; most scholars, less controversially, attribute the transformation to psychological and social factors alone.
The West was not entirely alone in this. Take the case of Tokugawa Japan (1600–1868). The carrot: reputation as capital. The Ōmi merchants’ sanpō-yoshi— “good for seller, buyer, and society”—made honesty the norm, and their house codes carried it down the generations.
The stick: gonin-gumi—five-household groups, within a rigid caste structure, collectively responsible for any member’s transgression. Every neighbour, then, an enforcer. Draconian punishment for fraud: beheading, crucifixion and banishment.
Thus, in West and East, reputation came to be prized over short-term advantage. This is the essence of civilization: recognition that, in the long run, honesty and true profit become indistinguishable. Fair dealing between strangers—as if kin—enables trade; trade generates wealth. Where truth cannot be assumed, every interaction becomes a costly, paranoid competition—making permanent the poverty that is man’s common lot. Honesty may be the only natural resource.
How else to explain Switzerland, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea— prosperous, high-trust, but conspicuously lacking the mineral wealth unthinkingly assumed to be prosperity’s prerequisite? Or the reverse—the so-called “resource curse”: states blessed by plentiful but unearned natural wealth tend towards a corrupt stagnation (Venezuela, Nigeria). Easy money, it seems, has its cost.
If everything hinges on honesty, the human psyche should reflect that. Indeed, when psychologists first analyzed the language people naturally use to describe one another, the most powerful dimension that emerged was moral evaluation itself. Before the now-standard Big Five personality traits could be derived, purely evaluative adjectives—good, bad, worthy, despicable—had to be set aside. Their inclusion collapsed the entire structure of personality into one giant factor: good versus evil, bluntly speaking. All other differences were obscured.
We are wired to ask first whether another person can be trusted not to exploit or betray us. On that determination rests safety, trade, cooperation, and the very possibility of peace. The absence of trustworthiness renders everything else—warmth, energy, composure, diligence, creativity—irrelevant.
Wolves Among Sheep
There is a risk, however, when civilized behavior becomes predictable. When honesty, safety, and security become the norm, their unlikelihood, the difficulty of their achievement, and the persistent reality of criminal actors (or worse) can be forgotten. Where a widespread peace has reigned throughout living memory, the fact that man can be a wolf to man becomes foreign. Trust degenerates into naïveté; empathy becomes less a laudable virtue than an incautious invitation to exploitation. Once people are more sheep to be fleeced than courageous traders, the wolves close in.
Evolutionary game theorists— most famously Robert Axelrod, whose tournaments pitted strategies against one another in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma — demonstrated that cooperators outperform defectors, generating collective wealth through trust and repeated exchange. But successful cooperation creates opportunity for defectors. Without defenses—reputation-tracking, punishment for cheating, conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat — defection spreads until the cooperators are overrun and the wealth they built is lost.
Cooperation builds peace and prosperity—but every store of trust, like every store of grain, draws its parasites—and, in time, its predators. At the level of the individual, these wear the faces of the Dark Tetrad: the narcissist, who deems himself entitled to what others have earned; the Machiavellian, who treats every human interaction as an opportunity for manipulation; the psychopath, unburdened by empathy or remorse; and—worst of all—the sadist, for whom the suffering of the victim is not cost but reward.
At the level of the group, exploitation takes a form older and arguably more dangerous: the tribal or religious insistence that the ingroup alone is truly human, while the outgroup is not merely barbarian but legitimate prey—its property ripe for pillage, its women for rape, its civilization for demolition.
When the personal and the social variants combine—when the predator finds in his creed a warrant for his predation—the result is not crime as we ordinarily conceive it, but something approaching campaign. Is it not exactly such a combination that confronts us in the case at hand?
The Scale and the Character of the Crimes
Perhaps the first fact relevant to that question is the sheer scale of the crimes—although the deepest scandal is that their scale cannot be established. No one knows how many native English girls were sexually assaulted. When the state agencies charged with protecting children cannot even count them, something has gone seriously astray. Lowe’s report claims 250,000.
That figure has been criticized as exaggeration, but it is in keeping with estimates such as those offered by Baroness Williams of Trafford—a Conservative peer and former Home Office minister—who as early as 2020 suggested approximately 7,000 victims per year. Extrapolated across the thirty or so years that the organized rape has been occurring, a figure of the same order emerges. The true number, whatever it is, is large enough that no further argument should be required.
Some context, for indication of severity: when the Imperial Japanese Army so infamously overran the Chinese city of Nanking in 1937, an estimated 20,000–80,000 women were raped. The situations are not directly comparable—the Nanking perpetrators were uniformed soldiers of a specialized military apparatus, and the atrocities were compressed into a single month. But the comparison establishes the order of magnitude, given that the rape of Nanking is rightly regarded as one of the low points of human conduct in the brutal twentieth century. Whatever the true British figure, it is far beyond scandalous.
The second relevant fact is that even the term “rape” understates the character of these crimes. The terminology itself formed a gradient of evasion. “Asian grooming gang” diluted responsibility across extremely diverse ethnic groups, implicating, for example, Chinese, Vietnamese, Hindu and Sikh communities with absolutely no connection to the offending. “Grooming gang,” per se, avoided all direct reference to the sexual violation and downplayed its organized, sustained and programmatic nature.
Even “rape gang ,” the bluntest of the three, names the crime but not the context—leaving the ethnic, cultural and religious dimensions unspoken. In reality, the documented cases involved networks of men—predominantly of Pakistani Muslim heritage—systematically targeting vulnerable white British girls, with first encounters commonly at ages eleven to fourteen.
Survivor testimony and court evidence from Rotherham, Rochdale, Oxford, Telford and other towns recount the same brutal story: girls passed from man to man, subjected to repeated gang rapes, physical torture, psychological degradation, and explicit racial and religious contempt. The victims were routinely slurred as “gora,” “kuffar,” “white slags,” “easy meat”—language marking them as inherently inferior and available for abuse precisely because they were white and non-Muslim.
The fact that the girls were typically so young adds to the heinousness of the crimes. Violation of innocence is, of course, the signature of the sadist—and the manipulation of what were essentially children for sexual purposes something particularly unforgivable. Add to that the fact that this was all done in a manner purposefully designed to indicate cultural superiority as well as to humiliate and degrade, and the true nature of the acts becomes clear: the crimes combined sexual violence with collective sadism and identity-based dehumanization on a scale that consideration of individual pathology alone does not explain. None of this was incidental, either: cruelty, humiliation, and demoralization were the point—and the sexual gratification, in the final analysis, was not.
What this directly means is that large numbers of men, drawn disproportionately from the most populous subgroup of the UK Muslim immigrant population, were actively engaged in what can only be called hate crimes, directed at the most vulnerable members of their host society—and worse: that within the networks these men organized, the crimes were regarded not as immoral but as justified, warranted by the supposed religious and cultural depravity of the girls, and of the society that produced them.
And exactly where does that leave us when trying to determine the potential causal role of the broader system of Islamic belief in relation to motivation for such crime?
And of course all that would be covered up—because who could believe it? And who would dare withstand the catastrophic personal consequences of suggesting or revealing such horror?
And it’s still worse: the “gora kuffar” were exploited not in the reprehensible but vaguely comprehensible manner of the opportunistic individual rapist, but in an organized, entrepreneurial, long-term manner—industrial in scale, multi-year in duration, involving dozens of men per network, with victims passed between “party houses,” hotels and towns. In documented cases the purposefully sadistic and degrading assaults often involved ten to twenty men per event, with individual victims catastrophically degraded, over time, by fifty to several hundred different men.
And worse yet: the direct perpetrators may have been a small percentage even of the community most directly involved. But a much larger and as yet unspecified proportion of their tightly bound fellows—bound by culture, marriage and kinship, cousin marriage being a common occurrence in such communities—were at least aware of the activity, if not actively abetting it. That proclivity to secrecy, that enabling and tacit approval, was mirrored precisely on the side of the UK authorities, producing a situation dangerous beyond comprehension for the girls so dreadfully involved.
And worse still: though the crimes were explicitly racially and religiously motivated—though the victims, and everything they represented, were purposefully subjected to cruelty and degradation over and above the sexual exploitation—virtually none were prosecuted or sentenced as racially aggravated offenses. No category of offense fits the designation of hate crime more precisely, or better justifies its existence.
And if that’s not enough—and it’s already more than enough—the crimes included not only the sexual sadism, exploitation and domination graphically outlined in Lowe’s Inquiry, but the equally reprehensible official response: cover-up, and even prosecution of the victims. Subsequent investigations confirmed what victims and some frontline workers had reported for years: police, social services and local councils knew, and preferred not to admit, what was happening. In consequence, thousands of girls were raped, trafficked and degraded while the authorities stood by, afraid of being called racist and anxious to protect “community relations.”
That’s not negligence. That’s not institutional failure. That’s collusion with the worst of men—in the service of an illusory, even fraudulent multicultural peace. Let us be crystal clear: the ethnic, cultural, and religious dimensions of both the perpetration and the cover-up are central, not incidental, to this story; their recognition is necessary to understanding how it happened and preventing its return.
What Cannot Be Named Cannot Be Understood
But recognition requires a name—for what cannot be named cannot be understood. What is the opposite of a cover-up, when dealing with crimes of this severity and magnitude? What should we even call this thing? What name fits a multi-decade, systematic, culture-and-religion-based campaign of the most sadistic sexual assault, undertaken to degrade, demoralize and destroy—and perpetrated on the most defenceless available victims?
To uncover such crimes—to confront even incontrovertible evidence of them—is to initiate a deep and dreadful process of exploration: What went on here, exactly? What caused it? How should it be dealt with? Much that is horrifying must be exposed before understanding becomes possible, to say nothing of amelioration or justice. When things are peaceful, after all, a shallow naïveté suffices. When things have gone this badly wrong, it is the presumptions held most dear that must be questioned. Something is the error. Something caused it. Something fundamental must change.
To not cover up is to accept that human depravity renders any naive view lethally inadequate, to question the doctrine that all cultures are of equal value — and thereby to undermine the entire multicultural project. It is also to expose oneself, personally, to the pitiless demolition of character reserved for those who fail to adhere to the party line: accusations of fostering dangerous divisiveness; expulsion from community, job and profession; the epithets far-right, racist, fascist, Nazi. To not cover up is to ask questions as serious as the crimes themselves:
Was this grooming?
Was this rape?
Was this sadistic sexual assault?
Was this sadistic pedophilic sexual assault?
Was this organized, systematic, sadistic pedophilic sexual assault?
Was it organized, systematic, sadistic pedophilic sexual assault aimed at the degradation and psychological destruction of its targets?
Was this something cultural?
Was this something religious?
Was it a demonstration of domination?
Was it an organized religious demonstration of domination?
Was it something akin to war?
Not grooming, then. Not even rape. Something more brutal, efficient and planned; something motivated, furthermore, by the presumption of individual and cultural superiority, on ideological, moral—even religious—grounds.
Something akin to domination. Something akin, even more precisely, to… conquest. But let us also not forget the specific and dreadful means of domination and conquest—one so often applied on the open battlefield: rape, of the most vicious sort. Thus, a more fitting term: sexual conquest.
These then were sexual conquest gangs: organized networks for whom the bodies of the outgroup’s daughters were territory to be held in contempt, taken and spoiled—the ancient tribal warfare of pillage and rape, conducted under conditions of nominal peace, against a host society too trusting, too tolerant, and finally too afraid to name what was happening.
Who could or would withstand the pressure of inquiring more deeply; of defining, particularly once the chance of collateral damage—to family, for example—was factored in? The psychological consequence of realizing that evil genuinely exists is truly something to fear. Combined with the savaging of a good name, the suffering of loved ones, and genuine social exclusion, it can be lethal—or worse than lethal, because there are forms of suffering worse than death. And it is good people who are most vulnerable: they have reputations worth ruining, families they cannot bear to see suffer, and the stubborn habit of telling the truth.
To not cover up is therefore to become a martyr.
The Cascading Implications
And what exactly are we admitting exists, if we refuse the cover-up? What are the cascading implications of the fact that sexual conquest gangs operated untrammelled and unrecognized in what was until recently an honest, secure and productive society—one where high trust was the proper order of the day?
Certainly the societal division we are constantly warned against, not least by those attempting to justify their own failure to act. Certainly the demand for justice for the victims and criminal responsibility of the perpetrators—a demand mounting rather than declining with the passage of time. Certainly the necessity of reconsidering the cherished liberal axioms that produced mass immigration from the very cultures in which such predation found its justification—and that forbade naming it once it arrived. And what does that imply for the multicultural project itself? For immigration policy going forward? For the—justified?—resurgence of nationalism?
There are yet more brutal questions waiting to be asked. How does honest admission of the problem embolden that element of the right for whom mass deportation is the most rather than the least liberal of the available options? Why should the traditional British public not conclude that a virtual state of war now exists in the country they patriotically cherish? Given that thousands of men in organized networks sadistically exploited, physically brutalized and psychologically destroyed hundreds of thousands of that country’s most vulnerable citizens, justifying their predation on essentially religious grounds, and prosecuting it with a toxic combination of sex and violence?
What is the appropriate interpretation of that situation? How, indeed, should the public respond?
Note, too, that the continued failure of those properly responsible for administering justice virtually ensures that much rougher consequences will be called for, and perhaps implemented, by those no longer willing to tolerate the moderation we have come to expect from democratic police, judiciary and elected officials.
Those on the leftward side of the spectrum are already decrying the increasingly obvious resurgence of the so-called far right. But the standard defenses against such movements are rapidly losing their force. Accusations of racism are effective only when prejudice itself is regarded, axiomatically, as evil, and when the accusers retain some integrity of reputation, so that their finger-pointing remains credible. The self-evidence of both preconditions is eroding. Meanwhile the epithet “far right,” with its connotations of obvious unacceptability, is leveled against people who are not far right at all—or not yet. It is a dangerous thing to lump traditional patriots and believers in their culture together with true fascists, let alone with those who use patriotism as camouflage for essential cruelty and an appetite for force.
What Must Be Done
What should be done—indeed, what must be done, lest such things continue, or worse? The perpetrators, particularly the ringleaders, must be brought to justice — untempered by any cowardly or ideologically motivated consideration of identity, community relations, or political convenience. Justice must be done, to put it simply, and be seen to be done. Their kinsmen and communities, silent and complicit—even approving—in their knowledge of what was occurring, must also be brought to account. The same goes for those in authority guilty of willful blindness and conscious cover-up—those outside the immediate community of perpetrators, who violated the integrity of their professional positions and broke faith with the public they swore to serve.
The guilty and the complicit alike must be punished with a severity that matches the crime—a crime which combines the worst elements of mafia-like organization, sexual assault, sadism, pedophilia, traitorous betrayal, and racial, religious and ethnic hatred. Indeed, a truer and more serious crime of hate—precisely the offense so recently codified by those most likely to turn a blind eye in this case—can scarcely be imagined.
In the absence of a proper response to the sexual conquest gangs now so undeniably documented, an over-correction is certain. Continued suppression of the normative majority’s insistence that cultural norms be upheld—that is, that vicious, hate-motivated serial rapists face consequences—will do nothing but ensure that when the tide turns, it turns with a vengeance.
The writing is already on the wall."
https://x.com/imtiazmadmood/status/2080631351326224633?s=51&t=cLq01Oy84YkmYPZ-URIMYw
" Here are the three Stages of Jihad in Islam.
Islamic sources and classical jurisprudence describe the spread and establishment of Islam as occurring in three distinct stages, each defined by the relative strength or weakness of the Muslim community and the corresponding rules for dealing with non-Muslims. These stages are derived from the chronological development of the Quran (early Meccan → late Meccan → Medinan) and the principle of naskh (abrogation), where later verses override earlier ones.
Stage 1: No Retaliation / Peaceful Preaching (when Muslims are a weak minority)
Period: Early Meccan phase (first ~13 years of prophethood).
Instructions: No fighting permitted, endure persecution patiently, invite others with kindness and wisdom.
Key verses:
Quran 109:6 – “To you your religion, and to me mine.”
Quran 73:10 – “And be patient over what they say and avoid them with gracious avoidance.”
Quran 16:125 – “Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best.”
Quran 20:130 – “So be patient over what they say and exalt [Allah] with praise of your Lord…”
This is the phase most often quoted in modern interfaith contexts and dawah when Muslims are still a small minority.
Stage 2: Defensive Fighting (when Muslims have gained some strength but are not yet dominant)
Period: After the Hijra to Medina, when the Muslim community has a base of power.
Instructions: Fighting is permitted, then made obligatory, but framed as “defensive” (though the definition of aggression expands to include insults to Islam, refusal to accept Islam, etc.).
Key verses:
Quran 22:39–40 – “Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged…”
Quran 2:191 – “And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you…”
Quran 2:216 – “Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you…”
This is the transitional phase where jihad becomes a religious duty once the community has sufficient power.
Stage 3: Offensive Warfare / Total Dominance (when Muslims are strong and in control)
Period: Later Medinan revelations and after the conquest of Mecca; considered the final and permanent ruling by classical scholars.
Instructions: All limitations are removed. Non-Muslims must be fought until they submit, pay the jizyah (protection tax) while humbled, or are eliminated.
Key verses:
Quran 9:5 (the “Verse of the Sword”) – “And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way.”
Quran 9:29 – “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture—[fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.”
Quran 8:39 – “And fight them until there is no fitnah [disbelief/persecution] and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah.”
Sahih Muslim 19:4294 (or 1731) – “I have been ordered to fight the people until they say ‘There is no god but Allah’…”
Classical scholars of all four major Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali) and most Shia scholars agree that offensive jihad to expand Islamic rule becomes a communal obligation (fard kifaya) once the Muslim state has sufficient strength.
Summary of the three stages:
Muslims weak → Stage 1: “No compulsion in religion,” peaceful coexistence.
Muslims equal in strength → Stage 2: Defensive jihad (broadly defined).
Muslims strong → Stage 3: Offensive jihad until Islam dominates or non-Muslims submit under dhimmi status."
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